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PARTIES 
The only parties to this action are those named in the 
caption. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court is authorized by Section 78~2A-3(h), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) to hear this appeal from the First 
District Court for Box Elder County. This is a divorce or 
domestic relations case. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is a consolidated appeal. 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Honorable 
Gordon J. Lowe, Judge of the First District Court of Box Elder 
County in a civil action for divorce, paternity, property 
division, and child support. It is also an appeal from a 
subsequent order to show cause which was signed by Judge Low to 
enforce child support provisions of the divorce decree. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting blood tests into 
evidence on the issue of paternity where other blood tests had 
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come to a different conclusion? 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that the Appellant 
was the father of the child despite conflicting evidence? 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding back child support at 
a time when it was without jurisdiction to do so under Utah law? 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to make proper 
findings of fact established under Utah case law before it 
awarded child support? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and award 
excessive child support under circumstances where the Appellantfs 
income was not properly calculated? 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making a 
property distribution that failed to take into account the fact 
that the Appellant had $5f000 worth of equity in the family home? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah, 1988) establishes 
stringent standards for the admissibility of HLA blood testing in 
paternity actions. Appellant contends that under this case, the 
tests used should not have been admitted in this case. 
Under Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah, 1986), 
Peters v. Peters, 394 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964) a court's 
decision is not effective until an order is signed. Appellant 
contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award 
temporary child support between the period of the time that 
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the court ruled in Respondent's favor and the time that an order 
was actually signed. 
Under Johnson v. Johnson, 103 UAR 22 (Utah, 1989) the trial 
court was required to make specific findings of fact before 
awarding child support. 
Under Paryzek v. Paryzek, 110 UAR 46 (Utah, 1989), a trial 
court's property division in a divorce may be overturned if the 
court abuses its discretion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
A trial was held jji this case on September 26, 1988 before 
the Honorable Gordon J. Low in Brigham City, Utah. Judge Low 
ruled that Appellant was the father of one of the Respondent's 
children. Judge Low held that sufficient grounds existed for the 
divorce. Judge Low awarded child support and back child support. 
Judge Low granted future child support in the amount of $387 
per month in favor of the Respondent. Judge Low distributed the 
marital property and debts in such a manner that Appellant's 
equity in his home was not taken into consideration. The decree 
of divorce is attached to this brief as an addendum. 
Judge Low subsequently granted an Order to Show Cause in 
favor of Respondent awarding back child support. This was 
appealed from separately. The appeals have since been 
consolidated. A copy of this order is attached to this brief as 
an addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent sued Appellant for paternity and divorce in the 
First Judicial District Court in Box Elder County. As part of 
the paternity action, Respondent called Dr. Charles Dewitt to 
testify concerning HLA and ABO blood testing which had been done 
in this case. T.13 Dr. Dewitt ran blood tests in 1988 on the 
Appellant, Respondent, and a child Kathy Heyden. From these 
tests, he gave an opinion during the trial that the Appellant was 
Kathy Heyden's father. T.20 
On cross examination, Dn.. Dewitt revealed that in 1979, he 
had been called upon to do blood tests to establish paternity 
for Kathy Heyden. In 1979, the results of the tests Dr. Dewitt 
ran were much less certain. In fact, they were only 89% 
probable. T.25 Dr. Dewitt himself testified that this was 
insufficient for admission as evidence. T.25 A previous 
paternity action against the Appellant was dismissed in 1979. 
T.98 
Including Kathy Heyden, Respondent had a total of three 
children. It was alleged that Appellant was only the father of 
Kathy. He was never alleged to be the father of the other 
children. The other children were apparently born out of wedlock 
as well. 
During the trial Respondent testifed that she worked at 
Thiokol and earned an hourly wage of $11.40. Her net take-home 
pay per month was $1,473.64. T.57 She also received about four 
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hours overtime per month because of her work schedule. T.58 
Respondent and Appellant bought a home for $59,500. This 
home was foreclosed on by Western Mortgage in January of 1989. 
T.62,63. Respondent moved out of the family home in October of 
1987. Respondent resided in the home with her children. 
Appellant had been forced to move out of the home. Respondent 
made her last house payment in August of 1987. T.66 
A real estate broker appraised the home at $65,000. This 
left equity of approximately $5000. T.84 Respondent refused to 
surrender possession of the home to Appellant unless he gave her 
$2000. Respondent also failed to make payments on the home for 
her last several months of occupancy. T.85 Appellant testified 
that he would have been able to keep the home if Respondent had 
vacated the premises before back mortgage payments accumulated. 
After Respondent and Appellant separated, it took Appellant 
approximately seven months to obtain possession of the home 
again. At this point, he was simply unable to make up all the 
back mortgage payments. T.100,101 The home was sold by Western 
Mortgage at a foreclosure sale. T.108 
The Appellant also works at Thiokol. He has an income of 
$14.97 an hour. He currently receives very little overtime. 
However, in 1987 he had considerable overtime because of an 
accident which killed five people and caused considerable 
property damage at Thiokol. T.lll 
The court found the Appellant to be the father of Kathy 
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Heyden. T.135 The court than ordered the Appellant to pay child 
support of $387.00. T.144 The figure of $387.00 was obtained as 
an average from an income which varied from $2,594 per month to 
$3,771.00 because of overtime in 1987. Court records establish 
that the Appellant's overtime was indeed temporary and is not 
ongoing. R.137-141 Appellant is not getting significant overtime 
anymore. Back child support was awarded from August 1987 through 
October 1988 at $458.00 per month. The court refused to find that 
there was any equity in the family home. 
The trial court signed a memorandum decision on October 13, 
1988 awarding back child support and future child support. 
However, it was not until January 18, 1989 that the Court signed 
a Decree of Divorce. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Appellant 
from this decree and order on February 15, 1989. 
On April 3f 1989, Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause. 
She wanted immediate payment of the back child support. The 
trial court signed an order requiring payment. Appellant 
appealed from this order. The Notice of Appeal is dated April 
14, 1989. 
These appeals have been consolidated for purposes of 
judicial economy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has realized the dangers of allowing 
any new scientific evidence into a court of law. There must be 
guarantees that the evidence is thoroughly understood and is 
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reliable. This is particularly the case when evidence consists of 
statistical probabilities. It is hard for a trier of fact to 
objectively weigh numerical evidence against eyewitness 
testimony, photographs, and descriptive evidence. Therefore, in 
a case where HLA test results differ depending on the test, the 
court should refuse to receive the results into evidence. Any 
other result would be prejudicial to the Appellant. 
The undisputed evidence in this case was that there was 
equity in the family home prior to the date it was lost in a 
foreclosure sale. Such evidence came from an appraisal, the 
purchase price of the home, and the Appellant's testimony. 
Consequently, it was wrong for the trial court to find that no 
equity existed in the home. 
The trial court erred when it considered temporary overtime 
earnings of the Appellant in computing the amount of child 
support he should pay his child. This is particularly essential 
when Appellant's actual earnings (base pay) are only two-thirds 
of what his earnings mixed with temporary overtime turned out to 
be. 
The trial court had no jurisdiction to grant Respondent's 
order to show cause or to award any BACK child support. This 
because a statute divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a 
matter once it is appealed. Additionally, orders are only 
effective from the date they are signed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ADMITTING THE BLOOD TESTS AND THE TESTIMONY BY DR. DEWITT IN 
LIGHT OF EARLIER CONFLICTING TESTS 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken concerning the use of HLA 
and other blood testing during paternity lawsuits. Specifically, 
the court has expressed the view that such tests are inadmissible 
in paternity cases unless they are extremely reliable and 
appropriate safeguards are observed. 
In Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343 (Utah, 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that in order to be admissible as evidence 
during a paternity trial that HLA and ABO blood tests must have a 
95% or greater statistical probability of paternity. This is 
after the assumption is made that there is already a 50% prior 
probability of paternity. Additionally, the court held that 
evidence must be produced that the particular tests which were 
relied upon in the case were conducted in a reliable manner. 
Specifically, such tests must be conducted as specified by 
Standards for Parentage Testing Laboratories as developed by the 
American Association of Blood Banks or other equally reliable 
sources. 
HLA blood testing is still a test or relatively recent 
origin. As late as 1980, the Utah Supreme Court held that it had 
not been proven to be of sufficient reliability to be used as 
evidence on the issue of paternity. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 
P.2d 1228 (Utah, 1980). While this is no longer the case, it is 
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certainly evidence of the fact that HLA testing is still new and 
in its infancy. Great caution must be exercised with anything 
new. 
The harm that can result from a mistaken finding of 
paternity is obvious. This is stated in a recent Utah Law Review 
article. Here, the author stated: 
In a paternity action, the defendant is faced with 
the imposition of a life-long relationship with 
significant financial, legal, and moral dimensions. 
Unlike any other civil judgment, the establishment 
of a parental relationship has the potential to set 
in motion a process of engagement that is powerful 
cumulative, and whose duration spans a lifetime. 
[U.L.R. , 1988, P.7J.7] 
In the case at bar, the Appellant had previously been given 
HLA blood tests in 1979 to determine whether he was the father of 
Kathy Heyden. These earlier tests came up with an 89% 
probability of paternity. Such tests would not have been 
admissible under the Kofford decision. 
Tests run on the Appellant in 1988 indicated a 99% 
probability of paternity. Appellant contends that it was 
prejudicial, misleading, and confusing to the trier of fact to 
admit the more recent blood tests into evidence in light of the 
conflicting results from the earlier tests. The chance for 
confusing the trier of fact (judge) is great when one is dealing 
with scientific evidence. Appellant submits that in any case 
where conflicting tests are done that HLA testing results should 
not be received into evidence. There is something about 
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statistical or numerical evidence that is particularly dangerous 
in a court. It is very difficult to weigh such evidence along 
with eye witness testimony, photographs, and descriptive 
evidence. Appellant asks that this court hold it was prejudicial 
error to admit the 1988 blood test result into evidence along 
with Dr. Dewitt's testimony. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN 
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT THERE WAS EQUITY IN THE FAMILY HOME AND 
GIVE THE APPELLANT CREDIT FOR SAID EQUITY 
Prior to their separation and divorce, Appellant and 
Respondent had purchased a homg for $59,900 in Brigham City, 
Utah. This home was appraised by a real estate agent as being 
worth $65,000. Appellant testified (as an owner of the 
property) that there was probably $5000 worth of equity in the 
home before the house payments became delinquent and foreclosure 
occurred. 
Despite this evidence, the trial court found that no equity 
existed in the home. The house was purchased during Appellant's 
and Respondent's marriage. Therefore, any equity which would 
have accrued in the home should be split equally between the two. 
The evidence presented at this trial established that the 
home was foreclosed upon and all its value has been lost to 
Appellant and Respondent. This occurred because Respondent 
failed to make several months worth of house payments during her 
sole occupany of the home in August 1987. Respondent literally 
refused to allow Appellant to move back into the dwelling until 
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months of unpaid mortgage payments were due. Consequently, the 
home was foreclosed upon by Western Mortgage. 
Under Utah law, a trial court is given discretion in 
awarding property in a divorce action. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 110 
UAR 46 (Utah, 1989). However, the court's ruling will be 
overturned if there is an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant contends that it was an abuse of discretion to 
fail to find that there was equity in the family home at the time 
of the divorce. All evidence pointed to the contrary. 
Respondent admitted in her testimony that a real estate broker 
appraised the property at $65,000. Appellant testified that it 
was a nice home. He gave his opinion as a property owner that 
there was $5000 equity. The uncontroverted evidence shows that 
the home was purchased for $59,900. 
Assuming that there was $5000 equity in the home, Appellant 
should be credited for one-half this amount of $2500. We ask 
that the court either modify the decision to give Appellant 
credit for this equity or that the case be reversed and remanded 
to the trial court to hear further evidence concerning the value 
of the equity in the home. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
AWARDING $387.00 PER MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT 
The trial court applied the Utah Child Support Guidelines in 
determining that Appellant should pay $387.00 per month in child 
support. [U.C.A. 78-45-7.14] The trial court committed error 
- 12 -
because it improperly calculated the Appellant's monthly income. 
Evidence produced at trial indicated that Appellant 
regularly earned $14.97 per hour. Under the Utah Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines, a Appellant would be required to pay $332.00 
per month to support one child. However, during the year 
preceding the divorce, Appellant was able to work a great deal of 
overtime at Thiokol. This was because of an accident which 
killed five employees and caused considerable property 
destruction. T.Ill 
The court calculated that Appellant had a base pay of $2500 
per month. However, with overtime he was actually earning 
$3,700.00 a month in the year preceding the divorce. The court 
averaged these two figures and set monthly child support at 
$387.00 
It is a fact that Appellant's overtime has virtually come to 
an end. T.lll, R.135-141 Consequently, his base pay of $2500 per 
month is what the trial court should have used to determine his 
child support. Failure to base the child support award on the 
$2500.00 base income will work a grievous and unfair hardship 
upon Appellant. 
Appellant also contends that the Child Support Guidelines 
did not actually go into affect until July 1, 1989. Under old 
Utah law, the trial court was required to make certain findings 
of fact prior to awarding child support. The trial court made 
findings of fact. However, they are insufficient. 
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In Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah, 1988), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed a child support award because the trial 
court failed to make detailed findings of fact prior to awarding 
child support. This was mandated by U.C.A. 78-45-7, before it 
was amended. The court stated in this case that: 
Section 78-45-7 requires the trial court to con-
sider at least the seven factors listed therein. 
Further, those factors constitute material issues 
upon which the trial court must enter findings of 
fact. In this case, however, the trial court 
failed to enter findings on all of the factors. 
[752 P.2d at 911] 
The factors enumerated by U.C.A. 78-45-7, prior to its 
amendment were: 
(a) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) The relative wealth and income of the part-
ies ; 
(c) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) The need of the obligee; 
(f) The age of the parties; 
(g) The responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of other parties; 
In the instant case, the only findings of fact with 
relevance to child support concern the amount of the Appellant's 
and Respondent's income. No findings of fact with speak to 
standard of living, wealth, or the age of the parties. R.117-128 
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Other cases suggest such findings are/were necessary. Johnson v. 
Johnson, 103 UAR 22 (Utah, 1989). 
Failure to make these findings mandates reversal of the 
child support award. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO AWARD ANY CHILD 
SUPPORT PRIOR TO JANUARY 18, 19 89 
The trial court signed a memorandum decision in this case on 
October 13, 1988. However, no Decree of Divorce was signed until 
January 18, 1989. On February 15, 1989, Appellant filed a Notice 
of Appeal and appealed this case. On April 3, 1989, Respondent 
filed an Order to Show Cause attempting to enforce payment of 
back child support. The trial court ruled in favor of Respondent 
and made an order compelling Appellant to pay the back child 
support. Appellant appealed from this order on April 15, 1989. 
The back child support in question is from August of 1987 through 
January of 1989 (when the Decree of Divorce was signed). 
Quite simply, the trial court was without jurisdiction to 
make such an order either in the decree or in a subsequent order 
to show cause. In Peters v. Peters, 394 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964) the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
It is true that the main judgment is a final and ap-
pealable judgment as to the issues therein dealt 
with. When those questions as to divorce, custody 
of children, support money, alimony, and/or property 
rights are therein adjudicated and an appeal is 
taken, the district court is without further juris-
diction as to them. [394 P.2d 73] 
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It is true that the court has jurisdiction to provide for 
the support and maintenance of the children during an appeal. 
UCA 30-3-5. However, such jurisdiction does not extend to 
enforcing a BACK child support order dated before the decree of 
the divorce is signed. 
Additionally, the Appellant simply cannot be held liable for 
BACK child support before a decree of divorce is signed. In this 
case the decree was signed January 18, 1989. This is because of 
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-7. This section states: 
The decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date 
it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk 
in the register of actions or at the expiration of 
a period of time the court may specifically desig-
nate, unless an appeal ot other proceedings for 
review are pending... 
Thus the decree of divorce in this case became a final 
judgment on the date it was signed as stated in the above section 
of the Utah Code. See also Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 21 (Utah, 
1986). Pate v. Marathon Steel, 692 P.2d 765 (Utah, 1984). Wisden 
v. City of Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah, 1985). It follows that 
the court cannot direct ther Appellant to pay any amount of 
support prior to the date the decree and findings were signed by 
the court. The only back child support that Appellant could be 
responsible for would be that owing AFTER the decree was signed 
on January 18, 1989. 
Consequently, the court must reverse the trial court's award 
of back child support. It must also reverse the trial court's 
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subsequent order to show cause which was granted in favor of the 
Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has reluctantly allowed statistical 
evidence from HLA-ABO blood testing to be received in lawsuits 
for paternity. The court has imposed rigids standards upon the 
trial courts before this evidence can be received. These 
standards require that the testing be done in accordance with 
specific procedures and rules. Additionally, the tests must show 
at least a 95% probability o£- paternity. In the instant case, it 
was prejudicial error to admit a recent test which had results 
considerably different from similar testing done ten years before. 
Sufficient guarantees of reliability and accuracy were not 
present. Therefore, the Court of Appeals must reverse the finding 
of paternity. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed 
to find that there was equity in the family home. The 
uncontroverted evidence in this case was that the home was 
purchased for $59,900 and appraised at $65,000. The Appellant 
expressed an opinion that there was $5000 equity in the house. No 
evidence was presented from which opposite findings could be 
made. Therefore, the Court of Appeals must reverse and remand 
this case for a determination of the amount of equity in the home 
prior to its foreclosure. 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
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when it incorrectly determined Appellant's income for purposes of 
child support. The evidence presented unequivocably showed that 
Appellant's base salary was only $2500.00. It was true that 
overtime had brought his salary to approximately $3700 a month in 
1987. However, this was a temporary fluke caused by a tragic accident 
at his workplace. Additionally, the trial court failed to make 
proper findings of fact before determining and awarding the child 
support that it did. Specifically, findings concerning the 
wealth, position, and ages of the parties should have been made. 
Accordingly, the court committed reversible error in awarding the 
amount of child support it did and this must be reversed. 
The trial court acted without jurisdiction and in violation 
of the rules when it attempted to award and enforce child support 
which predated the decree of divorce. Once the divorce was 
appealed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce any back 
child support judgment. Additionally, support could only be 
awarded SUBSEQUENT to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Consequently, the Court's award of back child support must be 
reversed. Additionally, the Order to Show Cause which the court 
granted enforcing the back child support order must be reversed 
as well. 
Respectfully submitted this J37~H\.day ofc September, 1989 
Dar^HTOrius 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANCIS 0. HURT, JR. , 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 870030225 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
16th day of September, 1988, before the Honorable Gordon J. 
Low, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sittinq 
without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appear-
ing in person and with his attorney, Dale M. Dorius, and 
each of the parties having been sworn and testifying in 
their own behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, 
Dr. DeWitt having been called as a witness and testimony 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
M l C R O i I A ' D 
PII n 
M'»n !• £%?(?' 
f«"» 1 " ' >, fc*. 
Civi . No.: 870030225 
having been given, and the Court having taken said matter 
under advisement and having rendered his Memorandum Decision 
in writinq, and the Court being fully coqnizant of all 
matters pertaining therein, and having made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, 
NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY O R D E R E D , ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff, Cindy A. Hurt, is granted a 
Decree of Divorce from Francis 0. Hurt, Jr., said divorce to 
become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child, Kathy Jo Hurt, born February 12, 
1976, subject to the D e f e n d a n t s right to visit as allocated 
by the Division of Family Services and/or the Adult Proba-
tion and Parole. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plain-
tiff the sum of $387.00 per month as and for support, based 
on an average between the Defendant's base income of 
$2,594.00 and his historical income of $3,771.00 per month; 
should Defendant in the future be able to assert to the 
Court that his income has not been commensurate with that 
child support level, but rather remains at the base pay of 
$2,594.80, then he may petition the Court for a reduction of 
the same as provided by law. 
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4. That if the Defendant becomes obligated to pay 
support for the two (2) children he claims he has in the 
future, then additional support for these children should be 
considered for child support adjustment and the Defendant 
may petition the Court for a modification of the Decree as 
to child support. 
5. That should the Defendant's income remain at the 
historical income, then the Plaintiff shall also have the 
right to petition the Court for an increase in child sup-
port . 
6. That the Plaintiff is granted a Judgment of delin-
quent support from August, 1987 through September 30, 1988 
in the sum of $ 5 , 4 9 6 . 0 0 . 
7. That the Defendant is entitled to an offset of 
$2,000.00 for debts the Defendant has paid to date, plus 
another offset of $3,500.00 for debts still remaininq un-
paid, said sums to be subtracted from the delinquent child 
support and gives the Defendant a credit of $4.00 towards 
the support. 
8. Defendant is obligated to assume and discharge all 
of the marital debts incurred in the marriage, and the 
Plaintiff is obliqated to pay First Security Bank of approx-
imately $ 1 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 , Norwest Finance of $ 2 , 2 6 1 . 0 0 , Mastercard 
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First Security Bank of $780.00, Peoples First Thrift of 
$1,100.00 and Attorney Wynn E. Bartholomew of $1,000.00, and 
that the Defendant shall assume and discharge all other 
debts, holding the Plaintiff harmless from same with the 
offsets. 
9. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment of $277.00 
for the HL-A and $152.50 for the expert testimony of Dr. 
DeWitt and costs, for a total Judgment of $429.50. 
10. That the Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered 
to maintain their health and accident insurance on the minor 
child so long as it is available through their place of 
employment, with the Defendant being the primary provider 
and the Plaintiff the secondary provider, provided however 
that each of the parties are responsible for one-half [h) of 
all medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor child 
not covered by both insurance policies. 
11. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain his 
present life insurance naming the child as a beneficiary, 
provided however that other children of the Defendant may 
also be named as co-insurers and co-beneficiaries on an 
equal basis. 
12. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
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13. That if there is a deficiency on the family home, 
then each of the parties are ordered to assume and pay 
one-half (H) of the deficiency. 
14. That each of the parties are awarded their ov/n 
personal belongings and effects and automobiles presently 
they each now have in their respective custody and control. 
15. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
savings bonds that they have accumulated since the filing of 
the divorce and is not considered marital assets. 
16. That each of the parties are ordered to assume and 
pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this , / ^ day of January, 1989. 
APPROVED AS TJLFORM 
( 
VP> w 
'DALE'H. DORTUSl 
Attorney for Defendant 
GORDON J. LOW, 
District Court Judge 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tele: 621-2464 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY HURT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANCIS O. HURT, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE. 
Civil No: 870030225 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
6th day of March, 1989, before the Honorable GORDON J. LOW, one 
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, 
on the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt and for 
payment of continuing child support and for a Judgment on the 
arrearage, and on the Defendant's Affidavit to Modify the Divorce 
Decree, and the Court having made and entered an Order subject to 
the parties filing briefs, and said briefs having been filed by 
both parties and the Court having rendered its two (2) written 
Memorandum Decisions, and the Court being fully cognizant of all 
matters pertaining therein, enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment as and for 
delinquent support through March 1, 1989, in the sumppf $2,322.00 
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and that the month of April, 1989 is not included. 
2. That Defendant is ordered to continue making his 
child support in the sum of $387.00 per month, as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
3. That the Court in order to avoid hardship to the 
children, does have the power to award a temporary order of 
child support and maintenance and does so. 
4. That Plaintiff is granted a Judgment for $250.00 
attorney fees, plus $53.50 costs. 
5. That the Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce as to child support is denied in that Court does not 
have sufficient information to justify a modification of the 
Decree. Further, since the Defendant has appealed this matter 
in the Supreme Court, that a further modification of the Decree 
may not be in order in that the Court may not have jurisdiction 
to modify the Divorce Decree. 
6. That Plaintiff's counsel has directed and ordered 
to prepare an Order in accordance with the Judge's Memorandum 
Decisions. 
DATED this / Z day of Apri^, 1^89. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable GORDON J. LOW, 
Judge of District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this <?7 day of April, 1989, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER 
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, by placing same in the United States Mail, 
-2-
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postage prepaid and addressed to the following; 
Dale M. Dorius #0903 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
ft. fr«*Xtt 
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